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In any given year, the Federal Communications Commission confronts many issues of interest
to economists. This paper summarizes four issues of interest during the last year: Spectrum
Auctions, Media Ownership, Quality-Adjusted Cable Prices, and Leased Access. It highlights
the role that economic analysis played in each and identifies areas where further research would
be fruitful.
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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent United States federal regulatory
agency charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television,
wire, satellite, and cable. Its mission is to ensure that the American people have available rapid,
efficient communications services at reasonable cost and without discrimination. The Commission
has both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The former are embodied in “rulemaking”
proceedings, typically involving the development or implementation of regulatory policies. The
latter are embodied in adjudications, including the review of mergers that involve the transfer of
spectrum licenses or authorizations to provide interstate telecommunications services.
Economists play a prominent role in many FCC proceedings. Unlike at the U.S. and E.U. competi-
tion agencies, the FCC’s 50+ economists are (for the most part) organized within bureaus according
to industry specialty.1 Economists therefore work closely with lawyers and engineers (as needed)
on issues as they come before the Commission.2
In the last year, there have been many issues of interest to economists, including mergers (Lib-
erty Media/DirecTV, XM/Sirius), the 700 MHz spectrum auction, regulatory reform for Universal
Service obligations, issues surrounding “network neutrality” (Comcast/BitTorrent), media owner-
ship rules, and regulatory issues in cable television markets (leased access, wholesale tying, and
quality-adjusted cable prices). It is impossible to treat carefully all of these issues; consequently
in this article we will focus on four of them: spectrum auctions (especially the 700 MHz auction),
media ownership, quality-adjusted cable prices, and leased access in cable markets. These were
chosen in part to reflect those issues that most captured the public’s attention (700 MHz; media
ownership) and in part to highlight how relatively simple economic principles can inform relevant
policy-making (quality-adjusted cable prices, leased access).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes recent developments in
FCC Spectrum Auctions with an emphasis on the 700 MHz auction. Section 3 summarizes the
recent media ownership rules and how they related to economic research sponsored by the FCC.
Section 4 introduces a measure of quality-adjusted cable prices, and Section 5 describes the recent
change in maximum rates for leased access to statutorily-required cable system channel capacity.
Section 6 concludes.
1Each of the largest bureaus (Media, Wireless Telecommunications, Wireline Competition, and International) has
its own Chief Economist and numerous staff economists. The Commission’s Chief Economist is located in the Office
of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis and reports directly to the Chairman of the FCC.
2Froeb, Pautler, and Roeller (2008) discuss the tradeoffs between a functional and divisional organization for




The FCC was first granted authority to auction licenses for spectrum in 1993 and, with several
exceptions, was required to auction licenses for spectrum in 1997.3 The general goal for spectrum
allocation is to ensure that it is used for the benefit of the national public. The FCC has tried to
implement this goal by designing auctions that specify and assign licenses quickly and efficiently,
are robust to strategic behavior by bidders, raise significant revenue, and are perceived to be fair,
transparent, and objective.
To achieve these goals, the FCC immediately settled on a simultaneous multiple round (SMR)
auction design.4 In an SMR auction, all licenses are available during the entire auction, and
bids are accepted until there are no new bids on any licenses. This design facilitates the efficient
combining of complementary licenses, substitution among alternative licenses, and allows bidders
to develop and implement efficient backup strategies should the auction develop in unanticipated
ways. There have been numerous incremental innovations to the basic SMR design over the years.
In the two previous survey articles on “Economics at the FCC”, Marx (2006) and Connolly and
Kwerel (2007) highlighted several issues of interest to economists in the area of auction design, in-
cluding auctions with endogenous license characteristics, anonymous bidding, and package bidding.
The latter two were implemented in the recently concluded 700 MHz auction.5 We discuss the
motivation for and consequences of these features in what follows, as well as highlight interesting
features of the licensing rules and prices across the various components (“blocks”) of spectrum sold
in the auction.
2.2 700 MHz Auction
On March 18, 2008, the FCC concluded the auction of 62 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz band.
This spectrum will be available to the auction winners at the conclusion of the digital transition on
February 17, 2009, when all high-power analog television broadcasting will cease. Figure 1 shows
the band plan for the auction. The gross revenue from winning bids was $19.12 billion, the largest
amount in any single FCC auction. Net revenue, accounting for bidding credits, was $18.96 billion.
3Much of this background section borrows extensively from Marx (2006) and Connolly and Kwerel (2007).
4With few exceptions, FCC spectrum auction have had an SMR design. See McAfee and McMillan (1996),
Cramton (1997), and Kwerel and Rosston (2000) for further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of SMR
auctions.
5This is not to minimize the importance of endogenous product choice in an auction context. In a recent FCC
working paper, Bykowsky, Olson, and Sharkey (2008) analyze an auction-based approach to selling both spectrum
licenses and the licensing rules that apply to that spectrum.
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Figure 1: Band Plan for the 700 MHz Auction
Anonymous Bidding and Package Bidding The 700 MHz auction, designated Auction 73
by the FCC, incorporated two new design elements of interest to economists: anonymous bidding
and package bidding.6 With anonymous bidding, the FCC announced only the amount of each
bid during the auction, without identifying the associated bidders.7 As discussed in Marx (2006),
a considerable body of theoretical economic research supports the view that anonymous bidding
inhibits either tacit or explicit collusion among bidders and/or retaliatory bidding to punish a
bidder who violates an agreement. (Brusco and Lopomo (2002), Marshall and Marx (2007)).8 On
the other hand, knowledge of bidder identities may promote economic efficiency – for example, by
providing information about the technologies that others are likely to deploy on the band.9 It is
hard to measure directly the consequences of anonymous bidding on the allocation or prices of the
700 MHz licenses, since we do not observe the counterfactual outcomes that would have occurred in
the absence of anonymous bidding. Whether, and if so how, anonymous bidding changed bidding
behavior in the AWS and/or 700 MHz auctions relative to prior “full information” FCC auctions
6Marx (2006) also describes the use of anonymous bidding in the auction for Advanced Wireless Services (AWS).
Connolly and Kwerel (2007) describe the motivation for and consequences of package bidding as well as experimental
evidence on the performance of package bidding in auction contexts.
7The FCC withheld, “until after the close of bidding, public release of (1) bidders’ license selections on their
short-form applications, (2) the amounts of bidders’ upfront payments and bidding eligibility, and (3) information
that may reveal the identities of bidders placing bids and taking other bidding-related actions.” FCC Public Notice,
DA 07-4171, “Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008,” October 5, 2007, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-4171A1.doc.
8Cramton and Schwartz (2000) and U.S. Department of Justice (2006) provide empirical evidence of tacit collusion
through bid signaling in previous FCC auctions with full information.
9The technology deployed on adjacent licenses can affect the ability to roam and thus the costs of providing
inter-operable mobile handsets. The total number of handsets sold using a particular technology on a band can also
affect the unit cost of handsets for all licensees on the band using that technology.
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is an interesting area of further research.
The 700 MHz auction provided for “package bidding” on three pre-defined packages of licenses in
the C Block: (1) the “50 States” package containing the eight Regional Economic Area Grouping
(REAG) licenses comprising the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii; (2) the “Atlantic” package
containing the 2 REAG licenses comprising Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Gulf of
Mexico; and (3) the “Pacific” package containing the 2 REAG licenses comprising U.S. Pacific
territories. Under package bidding, bidders could place bids for individual spectrum ”parcels” or
for a package of parcels. If the highest individual parcel bids aggregated to more than the highest
package bid, then the individual parcel bids would win; if not, then the highest package bid would
win.
As it turned out, there were few package bids during the auction. Ultimately, only a single package
was won, the Pacific package. Google was the only party bidding on the 50 States package, and it
stopped bidding when the reserve price was reached. Verizon bid individually on all 8 REAGs in
the 50 States package and won all of them except the Alaska REAG.
While package bidding seems to have made little difference in auction 73 ex post, this could not
have been known with certainty ex ante. For Google, with no existing spectrum holdings and
seeking nationwide coverage, the availability of a nationwide package may have been important to
their participation in the auction. By contrast, Verizon, as an incumbent with spectrum holdings
nationwide, was not subject to the same “exposure” risk of failing to get complete nationwide
coverage in the 700 MHz band.10 Thus the availability of the 50 States package may have reduced
exposure risk, facilitating new entry. Further experience with package bidding is required for an
understanding of its effects.
Auctions with Conditions: The C and D Blocks One unusual feature of the 700 MHz
auction was that the C and D block licensees faced unique regulatory conditions. C block licensees
were required to provide an “open platform” for devices and applications. C block customers had
to be permitted to use any device and run any applications except when “reasonably necessary” to
protect or manage the network.11 Before the auction, there were concerns that the open platform
requirement would reduce a C block licensee’s revenue and raise its costs, thereby reducing the
amount that a bidder would be willing to pay for a C block license relative to another license with
comparable spectrum in the same geographic area.
10This exposure risk could also have been mitigated without package bidding if a nationwide license had been
designated for the C block. But that approach would have foreclosed the possibility of awarding regional licenses
separately to different parties.
11Code of Federal Regulations, 27.16. “Use of devices and applications. Licensees offering service on spectrum
subject to this section shall not deny, limit, or restrict the ability of their customers to use the devices and applications
of their choice on the licensee’s C Block network, except: (1) Insofar as such use would not be compliant with published
technical standards reasonably necessary for the management or protection of the licensee’s network...”
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In practice, the open platform requirement may have deterred most bidders from bidding on any
C block spectrum, because it may not have been possible to integrate spectrum with an open
platform requirement into a single system with other spectrum in the same geographic area that is
not operated on the same basis.12 This problem may explain why AT&T did not seriously bid on
the C block.13 Verizon, the winner of most of the C block spectrum, resolved the system integration
dilemma by deciding to provide an open platform for their entire network (Hansell (2007)).
The open platform requirement for the C block was conditional on meeting the aggregate reserve
price (of $4.64 billion) for the block. The Commission stated that if the aggregate reserve price was
not met for the C block, the block would be re-auctioned without the open platform requirement
and with different size licenses. This contingent re-auction format reflected Congressional interest in
the auction meeting a revenue target before the FCC sacrificed any revenues to attain non-statutory
policy objectives, such as an open wireless platform.
From the perspective of economic efficiency, there were two disadvantages of this approach. First, it
introduced “lexicographic” preferences for revenue over an open platform. Second, it (potentially)
required two auctions, with associated design and implementation costs for each. If there had
not been a firm budget target, an alternative approach would have been to provide a bidding
credit approximately equal to the public benefit (beyond that captured by the licensee) of an open
platform. This design would implement the open platform requirement when it is economically
efficient – i.e., when the public benefit plus the private value with the requirement exceeds the
value of the spectrum without the requirement.14 A precedent is the FCC’s tribal lands bidding
credit that is available to any winning bidder when it commits to providing wireless services to
qualifying tribal lands.15
For the D block, the Commission envisioned a Public Safety/Private partnership between the
D block licensee and the public safety licensee for the adjacent 10 MHz of spectrum allocated
for broadband public safety communications. The D block licensee was required to build and
operate a nationwide interoperable public safety broadband network that operated over the D
12Alternatively, it may be possible to operate a single system with an open platform in one geographic area and
without it in another area, but open-platform customers may have objected if they could not use their devices and/or
applications in areas where such use was blocked.
13AT&T made only two bids on the C block: Mississippi Valley in round 18 and Southeast in round 19. Neither
bid was a provisional winner, and both were dropped (so that they wouldn’t be retained in future rounds when
determining the provisional winners under package bidding).
14An example provides the intuition for this argument: Suppose that a license is worth $10 billion to bidder A
without any restrictions and $0 with them and is worth $5 billion to bidder B (with or without the restrictions),
and the bidding credit/public benefit is $3 billion. Under the bidding credit approach, the license will be awarded to
bidder A with a total social value of $10 billion. But under a contingent re-auction with a $4 billion reserve price,
the license will be awarded to bidder B with a total social value of only $8 billion. See Brusco, Lopomo, and Marx
(2008) and Marx (2008) for more discussion.
1547 C.F.R. 1.2110(f)(3), and Third Report and Order, released September 2, 2004, 19 FCC Rcd 17652. A winning
bidder may receive a $500,000 credit for each 200 square miles of qualifying tribal land within its license area, subject
to a cap based on the gross bid amount.
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block spectrum and the public safety broadband spectrum. The network was intended to provide
enhanced IP-based data and voice services to police, fire departments, and other first responders.
A nationwide network would increase economies of scale, and facilitate seamless interoperability
within and across jurisdictions, something that is difficult to do under the current fragmented public
safety communications systems operated by thousands of separate jurisdictions. Most of the time
the D block spectrum would have been used for commercial services, but in emergencies public
safety users would have had priority access. The D block licensee would also have had access to the
10MHz public safety broadband spectrum for commercial use on a secondary, preemptible basis.
In practice, the only bid (for $472 million) for the D block license did not exceed its reserve price
(of $1.33 billion), and the license went unsold.16
Price Differences One striking result in the 700 MHz auction was the difference in the average
price per unit of spectrum (measured as the product of bandwidth and population coverage – MHz-
pops) across the five frequency blocks. Figure 2 demonstrates that the average winning bid per
MHz-pop ranged from $.74 on the E block to $2.67 on the B block.
Figure 2: Average Prices by Block, 700 MHz Auction
Understanding the reasons for these price differences is important in evaluating the efficiency of the
auction mechanism. Price differences for identical items could be a sign of an inefficient auction
design because reallocating an item from a party with a lower value to one with a greater value
would increase total value. In the case of the 700 MHz auction, the different frequency blocks
were not identical, but were ex ante sufficiently substitutable to make interesting the question of
how much of the price differences could be explained by differences in characteristics of the blocks.
Doing so, however, requires a closer understanding of the differences in service rules and technical
16After the auction, the FCC issued a Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to seek comment on possible
changes in the 700 MHz D block requirements, including the rules governing public safety access to D block spectrum
in emergencies. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, released May 14, 2008, 23 FCC Rcd 8047.
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constraints across blocks.
As discussed above, the C and D blocks had unique regulatory requirements, making it unsurprising
that prices per MHz-pop differed between those and the other blocks. Similarly, the E Block differed
from all of the other blocks in that it was unpaired spectrum (a single contiguous frequency block
instead of two pieces separated by frequency). This made it less suitable for two-way radio services
such as PCS and Cellular that use Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) technology and more suitable
for two-way services using Time Division Duplex (TDD) technology or one-way broadcast services
such as mobile video, since high power (50,000 watt) fixed-site transmitters were permitted. In
many ways, the A and B blocks were the closest substitutes. What then drove the significant price
differences shown above?
One important difference between the A and B blocks was that the A Block was divided into
176 “EA” (Economic Area) licenses while the B Block was divided into 734 “CMA” (Cellular
Market Area) licenses.17 Furthermore, the geographic boundaries on the CMA and EA license
areas overlapped, so it was not possible to achieve precisely the same coverage area in an EA
by aggregating a group of CMA licenses. If it had turned out, contrary to fact, that A block
licenses were priced higher than B licenses, it would not have been possible to substitute a group
of lower-priced B block licenses with exactly the same coverage. Conversely, it was not possible
during the auction to partition the lower-priced EA licenses into smaller geographic pieces that
matched the higher-priced CMA licenses on the B block. In other words, even though there were
price differences between the A and B blocks, bidders could not easily arbitrage away those price
differences because of the differences in license geographic areas. Another important difference
between the A and B blocks was potential adjacency effects. The A Block is adjacent to television
channel 51. Operating transmitters on the A Block (channel 52) could interfere with televisions
that are receiving channel 51 (Television channel 51 operates in 41 of the A Block license areas,
including Chicago.) Furthermore, its adjacency to unpaired Block E where up to 50,000 watts of
base station power is allowed rather than the normal 1,000 watts (2,000 in rural areas) in the paired
bands may have lowered the perceived value of A block licenses.18
While not a substitute for detailed statistical analysis, at first blush it looks as if differences in
technical factors, license configurations, and license obligations drove much of the price differences
in the 700 MHz auction. Measuring the prices per MHz-Pop within and across markets and FCC
auctions and relating those to features of the market, time period, and (especially) license rules
17It is not obvious a priori whether smaller or larger license areas are likely to bring higher bids. Smaller license
areas may fit better with holes in incumbents’ service areas or with small regional networks, while larger licenses
present reduced exposure risk for bidders that are trying aggregate large geographic coverage.
18To reduce this problem, the rules require that such high power stations reduce their emissions (power flux density)
on the ground to the same level as would occur if the station were working with the “normal” amount of power. This
will help, but the higher power in the adjacent block will still create a more challenging interference environment for
Block A than for Block B, and so may have contributed to the lower relative price.
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and auction design is a fruitful area for further research.
Efficient Design of Package Bidding Mechanisms The FCC is always seeking to improve
its auction designs. It may be useful for economists to analyze how various features such as license
specifications and package bidding mechanisms affect the auction efficiency. For example, would
an auction of more fungible licenses with common rules, common license areas across blocks, and a
simple package bidding design (e.g. limited to nested, non-overlapping “hierarchical” packages) bet-
ter facilitate efficient substitution across blocks and combining of licenses without excessive risk to
bidders that are seeking to acquire larger footprints? To what extent would such a design eliminate
price differences not based on differences in spectrum characteristics or regulatory requirements?
One of the many challenges in choosing a package design is the treatment of “old bids” that are not
currently provisionally winning. In the package bidding for the C block in the 700 MHz auction,
the FCC decided to “consider” all bids from all previous rounds in determining the provisionally
winning bids. This provides a bidder with the knowledge of the bids available to combine with its
bids to beat collectively a provisionally winning package bid.19 Holding bidders to all old bids also
ensures that prices always rise in the auction. Not holding bidders to all old bids and allowing prices
on individual licenses to fall to the minimum opening bid when beaten by a package bid would
provide the opportunity for bidders to maintain bidding eligibility without raising total auction
revenue by repeatedly bidding on individual licenses likely to be beaten by a package bid (so-called
“parking“).
On the other hand, retaining all bids may result in a bidder’s winning a license it no longer wants
when one of its old bids is combined with a new bid to beat a package bid. To avoid this latter
problem, the FCC permitted bidders to “drop” non-provisionally winning bids on C block licenses
in a single round of the bidder’s choice. Another way to avoid this problem of bidders winning “too
many” licenses is to allow them to specify mutually exclusive bids (e.g., “I want either license A
or B, but not both”). Unfortunately, permitting mutually exclusive bids adds significantly to the
complexity of the auction design.
3 Media Ownership
3.1 Background
Pursuant to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC must review its broadcast ownership rules
at fixed intervals: initially every two years; currently every four years. The purpose is to “determine
19This helps overcome the “threshold” problem discussed in Connolly and Kwerel (2007).
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whether any such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.” The FCC is
directed to “repeal or modify any regulation that it determines is no longer in the public interest.”20
The FCC’s previous broadcast ownership rules review, completed in 2003, adopted substantial
revisions to the local television station ownership rule, the local radio station ownership rule, the
radio-television ownership rule, the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule, and the national
television station ownership limit. Federal Communications Commission (2003) (the “2002 Biennial
Review Order”) describes the rules as they were prior to the 2002 review and the revisions.21
The most relevant of these rule changes (given subsequent developments) was the newspaper-
broadcast cross-ownership rule. In its 2002 Biennial Review Order, the FCC concluded that the
flat ban on newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership did not serve the longstanding policy goals of
competition, diversity, and localism. It found that newspapers and broadcast stations did not
compete in the same economic market; hence the rule was unnecessary to promote competition. The
FCC found that the rule was unnecessary to promote diversity of viewpoint, given the substantial
range of media outlets available in many markets and the conflicting evidence in the record on
whether ownership influences the viewpoints expressed via a media outlet. With respect to localism,
the FCC found that efficiencies from newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership can actually promote
localism and increase the quantity of local news and public affairs programming (based on a review
of the experience of newspaper-broadcast combinations that were “grandfathered” when the rule
was adopted in 1975 or that exist due to waivers of the rule).
The FCC’s decision was appealed, and in June 2004 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
certain FCC findings, including that a blanket prohibition of newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership
was not in the public interest. However, the court stayed the effectiveness of the rule revisions and
remanded them to the FCC for further justification or modification, since it found that the “cross-
media limits” that the 2002 Biennial Review Order adopted to replace the newspaper-broadcast
and radio-television cross-ownership rules were not supported by reasoned analysis.22 In September
2004, the court allowed certain revisions to the local radio ownership rules to take effect. Prior
to the court’s decision, Congress had passed legislation to revise the national television station
ownership cap (at 39%); as a result, that rule was not evaluated by the court nor reviewed in the
FCC’s 2006 quadrennial review.23
In 2006, the FCC began a new review of the existing ownership rules. As part of this review, it
20See 2006 Quadrennial Review Order, para. 1.
21See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 02-277, MM Docket Nos. 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, 03-130, 18 FCC Rcd 13620 (2003),
aff’d in part and remanded in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435, stay modified on rehearing,
No. 03-3388 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2004) (“Prometheus Rehearing Order”), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005).
22Ibid, paras. 9, 15-16.
23See 2006 Quadrennial Review Order, paras. 1-4.
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commissioned ten Media Ownership studies to facilitate its decision-making: three by FCC staff
and seven by outside experts. These studies were published on July 31, 2007. The content of the
individual studies was summarized in Connolly and Kwerel (2007).
3.2 The New Rules
In December 2007, the FCC completed its quadrennial review of its broadcast ownership rules. The
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration in MB Docket No. 06-121 (“2006 Quadrennial
Review Order”) was released in February 2008.24
The new rules left the FCC’s local radio and local television ownership rules, radio-television cross-
ownership rules, and the so-called “dual network” rule intact. There was, however, a modest
relaxation of the newspaper-broadcast rule. The previous flat ban was replaced with a case-by-case
approach. Under certain circumstances, the combination of a daily newspaper and a single radio
or television station in the same market is presumed to be in the public interest. However, the
presumption is rebuttable.25
Specifically, a newspaper-broadcast combination is presumed to be in the public interest if the mar-
ket in question is one of the top 20 Nielsen Designated Market Areas (“DMA”) and the transaction
involves one daily newspaper and only one television or radio station. Moreover, if the transaction
involves a television station, then post-merger the DMA must have at least eight independently-
owned and operated major media voices, and the television station involved in the merger cannot
be among the top four in the DMA with respect to audience share. “Major media voices” consist
of full-power television broadcast stations and major newspapers.26
If these conditions do not obtain, then a proposed newspaper-broadcast combination in a top
20 market is presumed not to be in the public interest. Additionally, any proposed newspaper-
broadcast combination outside of the top 20 markets is presumed not to be in the public interest.
The presumption is reversed, however, in two limited circumstances: when the station or newspaper
is “failing” financially or has “failed”, or when the proposed combination would result in a new
broadcast source of local news in the market. In order to meet the new source of local news criterion,
the combination would need to involve a broadcast station that was not offering local newscasts
prior to the merger; after the merger, the station would have to initiate at least seven hours per
week of local news programming.
2423 FCC Rcd 2010 (2008)
25See Ibid, paras. 53-75 for a detailed description of the rule, the presumptions, and the rationale.
26The Commission referenced Study 1 (of the 10 it commissioned) “How People Get News and Information”
prepared by Nielsen Media Research, Inc. to support the decision to count television stations and major newspapers
as major media voices. Major newspapers are newspapers published at least four days per week within the relevant
DMA and that have a circulation greater than five percent of DMA households. See Id., para. 54 and footnote 183.
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In any case, the presumption, either positive or negative, is rebuttable. The new regulations
establish four criteria for the FCC to consider in making its findings. The FCC is to consider
whether the combined entity will significantly increase the amount of local news in the market;
whether the newspaper and the broadcast station with which it is to be combined will continue
to employ their own staffs and to exercise their own independent news judgment; the level of
concentration in the relevant DMA, and the financial situation of the broadcast station or newspaper
(if one of them is in financial distress, the FCC will consider the commitment of the proposed owner
to invest significantly in newsroom operations).
In reaching this decision, the FCC evaluated the likely effects of cross-ownership on competition,
localism, and diversity. With respect to competition, the 2006 Quadrennial Review Order reaf-
firmed the finding of the 2002 Biennial Review Order that “for purchasers of advertising time,
newspapers, television, and radio are not good substitutes and therefore make up distinct product
markets,” and noted that this product market definition was not challenged on appeal. This led the
Commission to reaffirm the conclusion that “newspaper/broadcast combinations cannot adversely
affect competition in any relevant product market.”27 With respect to localism, they supported
the proposition that “cross-ownership can promote localism by increasing the amount of news and
information transmitted by the co-owned outlets.”28 With respect to diversity, the Commission
reaffirmed the conclusion of the 2002 Order that “retaining some cross-ownership limits is neces-
sary in order to ensure diversity,” further noting that the Prometheus court had agreed with this
conclusion.29 Moreover, the Commission stated that it “is not in a position to conclude that own-
ership can never influence viewpoint” and that it is “not in a position to quantify nontraditional
media outlets’ contribution to diversity.” This led the Commission to conclude that its diversity
goal would be served by a flexible newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership limit, rather than a flat
ban.
The Role of Research The primary role of research in helping reach these conclusions was
in shedding light on the impact of cross-ownership on localism – in particular, on the provision
of local news.30 The Commission noted the availability of “a considerable amount of empirical
evidence in the record on both sides concerning the relationship between newspaper/broadcast
combinations and localism,” and stated that “[O]n balance ... the evidence suggests that some
newspaper/broadcast combinations can enhance localism.”31
27Id., footnote 131.
282006 Quadrennial Review Order, para. 46.
29This diversity discussion is found in 2006 Quadrennial Review Order, paras. 47, 49, and 50.
30The Commission’s analysis of the impact of newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership on localism draws both on
examples provided by commenters that assertively demonstrate that additional news is provided as a result of cross-
ownership and on systematic statistical analysis.
312006 Quadrennial Review Order, para. 42
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In reaching this conclusion, the FCC drew primarily on three of its economic studies. Study 3,
“Television Station Ownership Structure and the Quantity and Quality of TV Programming” was
produced by Gregory Crawford. Section I of Study 4, “News Operations: The Impact of Ownership
Structure on Television Stations’ News and Public Affairs Programming” was produced by Daniel
Shiman. Study 6, “The Effects of Cross-Ownership on the Local Content and Political Slant of Local
Television News,” was produced by Jeffrey Milyo.32 The FCC also examined empirical submissions
from other parties, notably the Consumers Union (CU). In addition to the studies that the FCC
commissioned and the comments of interested parties, the Commission also had access to “peer
reviews” of these studies and submissions. The Commission solicited these reviews from outside
experts, pursuant to U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) procedures that took effect in
2005.33
The studies sponsored by the Commission found evidence that individual television stations that
are cross-owned with a newspaper in the same market offer more local news programming than do
stations that are not cross-owned.34 By contrast, CU performed its own analysis of the data used in
the FCC studies, claiming to have taken into account the critiques from the peer reviews. Among
the conclusions of CU’s analysis was that “newspaper/television combinations do not increase the
total quantity of local news in the market.”35 [Emphasis added]
The Commission evaluated the three studies that it had commissioned, taking into account the peer
reviews and the authors’ responses to the peer review, concluding that the three studies were, in fact,
reliable.36 The Commission also examined the CU analysis, and the critique thereof, and concluded
that it “cannot rely on its conclusions.”37 After reviewing the evidence, the Commission summed
up by stating that “[W]e recognize that there is disagreement in the studies. On balance, however,
we conclude that the weight of evidence indicates that cross-ownership can promote localism by
increasing the amount of news and information transmitted by the co-owned outlets.”38
32The studies (and related materials) are available at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html. The three
studies are summarized in Connolly and Kwerel (2007, 107-120).
33OMB requires that influential scientific information on which a Federal Agency relies in a rule-making proceeding
be subject to peer review to enhance the quality and credibility of the government’s scientific information. See OMB
Peer Review Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664; available at http://www.fcc.gov/omd/dataquality/peer-omb-reqs.pdf.
34See Connolly and Kwerel’s (2007, pp.111-112) discussion of Crawford (2007), Milyo (2007), and Shiman (2007).
35In turn, their analysis was critiqued in a submission on behalf of Media General. 2006 Quadrennial Review Order,
paras. 43-44.
36Id., para. 42 and associated footnotes. As detailed therein, Shiman and Milyo provided responses, implementing
revisions in response to the peer reviews.




Subsequent Developments The Commission’s decision was appealed by various parties; that
appeal is currently pending.39 Moreover, resolutions of disapproval have been passed by the U.S.
Senate and by the House Appropriations Committee. If the Congress were to pass a resolution
of disapproval and the President were to sign it or if it were passed over a presidential veto,
the 2006 Quadrennial Review Order rules changes would be invalidated. In the meantime, the
clock continues to tick and, pursuant to Congressional requirements, the Commission will review
broadcast ownership rules again in 2010.
4 Quality-Adjusted Cable Prices
4.1 Background
A topic of recurring interest at the Commission are prices for cable television services. In the last
25 years, cable prices have been de-regulated (1984 Cable Act), re-regulated (1992 Cable Act),
and de-regulated again (1996 Telecommunications Act).40 At the same time, competitors to cable
systems have grown: first in the form of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) systems (DirecTV, Dish
Network), and more recently with the entry of local telephone systems (Verizon, AT&T) in some
cable markets.
Irrespective of these changes in market developments, cable prices continue to rise. Marx (2006), in
her survey of the industry two years ago, described the patterns in industry prices reported in the
Commission’s annual Cable Price Reports. Figure 3, from Marx (2006), documents the increase
in prices for a variety of communications services between 1995 and 2005. It reports the average
price of overall, long-distance, international, and wireless telephone services, the average price of
Expanded Basic cable services, and (for comparison purposes) the U.S. Consumer Price Index
(CPI).41 The differing trends in prices for cable versus telephone services are striking. Nominal
prices for telephone services have fallen across the board, sometimes by as much as 80%. This is
in stark contrast to prices for Expanded Basic cable service: Figure 3 reports that average prices
for Expanded Basic cable service rose from $22.35 in 1995 to $43.04 in 2005, an increase of 92.6%.
What is driving these differences? Similar factors appear to be present on the supply side. The
widespread rollout of fiber-optic cable and advances in multi-plexing technology have (at times
dramatically) reduced distribution costs (as well as increased capacity). So too has competition
within and between various service providers increased. The primary difference is in content:
Unlike telephone services, cable systems select and distribute content (programming networks) of
392006 Quadrennial Review Order, petitions for review pending, Media Alliance v. FCC, No. 08-70830 (9th Cir.).
40See Crawford (2006) for a survey of the recent regulatory history of and market trends in the industry.
41The CPI is a useful benchmark for cable (or any) prices as it documents the general trend in the prices faced by
consumers.
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Figure 3: Prices for Communication Services
value to households, and both the number of these networks and the amount that they spend on
programming (which is passed on as costs to cable systems) have increased.42 Thus the quality of
cable service have surely increased. Are then consumers better or worse off?
4.2 Quality-Adjusted Price Measurement in General
Measuring the net effect of rising prices and quality is a well-known, but challenging, economic
problem. A simple two-period example provides the intuition: Suppose that prices and quality are
low in the first period and high in the second. To determine if households are better or worse off,
one would like to measure the aggregate consumers surplus (i.e., “consumer welfare”) from facing
the low-price, low-quality service and compare it to the aggregate consumers surplus from facing
the high-price, high-quality service.
This is the basic question underlying the calculation of a cost-of-living price index, the goal for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in its calculation of the CPI. If the demand for the indexed prod-
ucts is known, the calculation of a cost-of-living index is straightforward. Recent methodological
developments in the analysis of demand in differentiated products markets provide the necessary
42See, e.g., FCC (2005b) and Kagan World Media (2008).
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techniques,43 but the data required are comprehensive, often making the exercise infeasible.44
In practice, the CPI measures price changes for a fixed basket of goods using either matched-model
or hedonic techniques. In a matched-model approach, prices for a product are compared across time
periods. If a product disappears or a new product is introduced, either organically or via rotation
of the set of sampled products or outlets, the price of “the most similar” product is compared
to the missing one. If the most similar product is “non-comparable”, the price change is set at
the average of similar products in the index and any remaining price difference is attributed to
quality change. As discussed in Shultze (2003), this can either over- or under-estimate the “true”
quality-adjusted price change. In the hedonic approach used by the BLS, prices for non-comparable
products in the base period are imputed based on a hedonic regression of base-period prices on
base-period product characteristics. The price change for the “most similar” product is then just
the difference between the observed reference-period price and the imputed reference-period price.
There are important challenges inherent in measuring quality change using either approach. In
cable and satellite markets, the CPI uses a matched-model method to evaluate price changes, after
adjusting those prices for changes in the number of channels that are offered on sampled products.
This section abstracts from these issues to propose a simple alternative measure of quality-adjusted
cable prices. Rather than base measured cable service quality on the number of offered channels
(as done by the CPI), we base quality on the number of hours that people spend watching those
channels and calculate a cable Price-Per-Viewing-Hour (PPVH). There are both advantages and
disadvantages to this approach. The primary advantage is that the presence of more channels and
higher-cost (quality) programming on those channels should matter to households to the extent
that having access to them translates into watching more television. Furthermore, calculating
a price-per-network would be appropriate only if each network were equally valued (on average)
by households, something ratings data easily refutes. Disadvantages include not measuring the
benefits to households of reallocating viewing to preferred networks and the fact that other factors
besides cable service quality can also influence viewing hours (e.g., prices of substitutes and/or
complements). On balance, we believe viewing hours to be the better cable quality measure.45 We
take comfort that we are not alone in our choice.46
Why should one bother constructing a measure of quality-adjusted cable prices? Shouldn’t effort
43 The basic idea is to estimate how households trade off price and quality changes and estimate the consumer
surplus (welfare) effects of such changes. From these, one can construct an “exact” cost-of-living (price) index to
measure how much more or less households would be willing to pay to face services of different prices and/or qualities.
See, e.g., Pakes, Berry, and Levinsohn (1993) and Petrin (2003) for the general principles and Crawford (2001, 2008)
for applications of these techniques to cable markets.
44In addition to price and quality attributes, it is critical to have market shares as well as additional, often cost-side,
variables (“instruments”) that can help identify the structure of demand.
45Crawford (2008a) compares the two approaches, highlighting potential biases in each.
46Both the National Cable Television Association (NCTA (2008)) and industry analysts (Bernstein Research (2007))
also adjust cable prices by viewing hours.
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instead be devoted to accurately measuring the underlying demand curves necessary to construct a
true cost-of-living index? Or use hedonic techniques to quality-adjust cable prices? Our answer is
“Yes, but...”: Effort should be devoted to the collection and analysis of the data necessary to study
simultaneous price and quality changes,47 but at the same time it is useful to have an easy-to-
communicate and understand (if crude) measure of quality-adjusted cable prices. While imperfect,
a cable PPVH is easy to calculate using aggregate data and (we hope) provides insights into the
likely sign (if not the magnitude) of consumer welfare effects from simultaneously rising cable prices
and qualities.
4.3 Price Per Viewing Hour
Weighted Average Cable Price Before introducing the price-per-viewing-hour, it is important
to ensure that we are measuring the appropriate price(s). Most previous work in cable markets have
analyzed the price of Expanded Basic (EB) service. This is defined by the FCC as the combination
of two component services: Basic (B) service (typically providing all local broadcast and public,
educational, and government channels), and Cable Programming (CP) service (typically providing
the advertising-supported program networks – e.g. ESPN, MTV, and CNN – commonly associated
with cable television).
In practice, Expanded Basic cable prices likely understate cable expenditure increases for most
households. By January 2005, over 40% of cable households subscribed to a Digital (D) tier of
service.48 Accounting for this trend, Crawford (2008a) defines the Weighted Average Price
(WAP) of cable service as the average price of Expanded Basic service plus Digital service (where
Expanded Basic service is the combination of Basic service and Cable Programming service), with
the price of Digital service weighted by the share of Expanded Basic households that take digital.49
Figure 4 demonstrates this. The lower line reports the average price for Expanded Basic (B+CP)
service; this is analogous to the cable line in Figure 3. The upper line reports the average price
for Expanded Basic and the most popular Digital (B+CP+D) service, and the middle line is the
Weighted Average Price of cable service. Driven both by increases in the price of digital service
and the share of households that take it, the WAP of cable service has grown from $22.35 in 1995
to $48.44 in 2005: This is an increase of 116.7%, which is over four times the 25.0% increase in the
47There has been some previous research into this issue: Crawford (1998) calculates a cost-of-living index, and
Anstine (2001) and Brown and Uri (2004) conduct hedonic analyses in cable markets. Further work would be
welcome.
48A digital tier is a tier of service consisting of a bundle of networks that are distributed in digital (versus analog)
format. Crawford (2008a) reports the share of Expanded Basic households purchasing “the most highly subscribed
digital tier”.
49Note that this calculation considers cable households that take at least Expanded Basic (Basic + Cable Pro-
gramming) service. Thus it does not account for those households that just take Basic Service. The share of such
households is typically around 12% (e.g., FCC (2006a)).
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CPI over the same period.
For the purpose of calculating quality-adjusted cable prices, it is also important to include Digital
tiers, since a non-trivial portion of cable viewing hours happens on networks primarily or exclusively
offered on Digital services. We do so next.








































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Average EB (B+CP) Price Average EB+D Price
Weighted Average EB+D Price
Source: B+EB Prices: FCC (2006a), FCC (2007a); D Prices: FCC (2000), FCC (2001), FCC (2004a), FCC (2005a),
FCC (2006a), Crawford (2008a); D Share (for weighting): Crawford (2008a).
Price Per Viewing Hour (PPVH) The left panel of Figure 5 documents the trend in viewing
hours among cable and satellite households of the networks offered on Expanded Basic and/or
Digital cable services.50 Several patterns are evident: First, the average cable household is watching
much more cable television: Average viewing of ad-supported cable networks has risen from 24.4
to 37.7 hours/week, an increase of 54.5%.51 Furthermore, this viewing is (in part) coming at the
expense of broadcast television: Estimated average viewing of broadcast networks among cable
50 Information about average viewing hours/week on ad-supported cable networks is from the Cable Advertising
Bureau (CAB). Values are for the Cable Plus Nielsen universe, defined as “the households in the Total U.S. that can
receive cable programming via wired cable or other means” (Nielsen Media Research (2004, p.B)). Values from 2002 to
2005 are from http://www.onetvworld.org/main/cab/fasttrax/average-time-spent-with-c.shtml; values from
1997 to 2001 are from Wildman (2003). Information about average viewing hours/week for broadcast networks is
also from the CAB, though less cleanly. See Crawford (2008a) for details. In what follows, we use only ad-supported
cable hours to calculate a PPVH.
51This is driven by increases in the number of households that subscribe to cable and satellite television as well as
by migration of new and existing subscribers from broadcast to cable networks.
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households has fallen from 27.9 to 24.7 hours/week, a decrease of 11.5%. Overall, the rise in cable
viewing is greater than the fall in broadcast viewing, yielding an overall increase in viewing of
(ad-supported) television networks among cable households of 52.3 hours/week in 1997 to 62.4
hours/week in 2005, or an increase of 19.3%.
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Average B Price Weighted Average CP+D Price
Weighted Average B+CP+D Price
Given viewing hours, there are two ways to calculate a Price Per Viewing Hour: one using Total
prices and viewing, and one using Incremental Cable prices and viewing.52 Due to difficulties in
obtaining historical viewing hours of broadcast networks, we use the one based on incremental
prices and viewing; both yield similar results.53 Formally we define PPVH as
PPVH =
Weighted Average Price of CP+D Service
Ad-Supported Cable Hours
(1)
The right panel of Figure 5, from Crawford (2008a), splits the WAP of cable service into the average
price of Basic service and the weighted average price of Cable Programming and Digital service
that is necessary to calculate Equation (1). Figure 6 demonstrates the average Price Per Viewing
Hour using this equation. Average price per viewing hour has increased from 13.8 cents/hour in
1997 to 20.8 cents/hour in 2005, an increase of 50.7%, more than two and a half times the 18.8%
increase in the CPI.
52Total Price is the WAP: the average price of Expanded Basic service plus Digital service, with the price of Digital
service weighted by the share of Expanded Basic households that take Digital; Total Viewing is broadcast viewing
hours plus ad-supported cable viewing hours; Incremental Prices is the average price of Cable Programming service
(i.e., that part of Expanded Basic service that excludes Basic service) plus Digital service, with the price of Digital
service weighted by the share of Expanded Basic households that take Digital; Incremental Viewing is ad-supported
cable viewing hours. Crawford (2008a) introduces and discusses the two methods in more detail.
53Indeed, the measure based on Incremental Prices and Viewing yields the more conservative estimate of increases
in quality-adjusted cable prices.
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4.4 Conclusions and Implications
Figure 7 summarizes our results. It presents our preferred estimates of raw (unadjusted) cable prices
(the Weighted Average Price of cable service), our measure of quality-adjusted prices (PPVH),
and the the general trend in prices for all goods (CPI All Goods) between 1997 to 2005. As
expected, raw (unadjusted) cable prices rise fastest, by 84.1% over the 8-year period. Our quality-
adjusted measure, with an increase of 50.5%, shows smaller but still significant quality-adjusted
price increases. Both are significantly higher than the 18.8% increase in the CPI over the same
period.54 The conclusion is clear: Whether on an unadjusted or quality-adjusted basis, cable prices
have been rising far faster than inflation. While this is not the same as measuring the consumer
welfare effects of simultaneously rising prices and quality, at a minimum it suggests that consumers
are not necessarily better off in 2005 than they were in 1997. Further research quantifying the
welfare effects of price and quality changes in cable markets would be welcome.
Taking this as the premise, there remains the question of what can or should be done about rising
cable prices. Promoting competition in video markets is primary, and the FCC has a number of
matters that touch on this issue, including promoting uniform franchising standards55 and ensuring
that video operators do not discriminate against rivals that distribute video content through those
54As is the CPI’s cable price series. It adjusts for quality on a per-channel basis and shows a 41.8% increase in the
same period. See Crawford (2008a) for further comparisons between PPVH and the CPI cable price index.
55FCC (2007c)
20

















































1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year




operators broadband pipes.56 The FCC is also considering the consumer welfare consequences of
tying and/or bundling in both the wholesale and retail markets.57 This remains an important area
of concern for both consumers and the Commission.
5 Leased Access
On June 15, 2007, the Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the matter of
Commercial Leased Access (CLA) requirements facing cable television systems (FCC (2007b)).
The CLA requirements were introduced by the 1984 Cable Act and require a cable operator to
set aside channel capacity for commercial use by unaffiliated video programmers. The 1992 Cable
Act required the FCC to set maximum rates that cable operators could charge such programmers.
In implementing this directive, the FCC set a maximum rate formula for full-time carriage on all
programming tiers that had subscriber penetration greater than 50%. These rates were based on
the “average implicit fee” that other programmers were charged for carriage on those tiers.58 Cable
56FCC (2008a).
57The FCC has published two reports analyzing à la carte pricing (FCC (2004b), FCC (2006b)) and is examining
the issue of wholesale tying (FCC (2007d)). In the economics literature, Crawford (2008b), Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2008), and Yurukoglu (2008) attempt to quantify the consumer welfare benefits of à la carte sales of cable networks
to households in cable markets.
58See Second Report and Order (SRO), 12 FCC Rcd 5267, 5283 (1997). The SRO also set rates for channels that
are offered on an à la carte basis based on the “highest implicit fee” that other programmers are charged. In this
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operators were permitted to use any unused channel capacity designated for leased access.
In the years after these rules, very few programmers signed up for carriage via leased access.59
Their primary complaint was that the “average implicit fee” yielded a rate for leased access that
was far higher than they could expect to recoup by either advertising or subscriber revenue. A
maximum rate based on an average implicit fee is also hard to justify on economic grounds. If the
goal is to ensure that the cable operator is insulated from lost profits by providing channel capacity
to a leased access programmer, then the relevant object of interest is the operator’s opportunity
cost of carrying the last network that it offers. In other words, the maximum price should be set
equal to an operator’s Marginal Opportunity Cost, not its Average Opportunity Cost.
On February 1, 2008, the Commission released a Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that, among other things, implemented this change (FCC (2008b)). It defines the
operator’s marginal channels as the last channels that are carried by the cable system and the
marginal implicit fee as the operator’s average net revenue from those channels. It then uses the
marginal implicit fee to set the maximum leased access rate, subject to an overall cap of $0.10.60,61
The set of channels over which the operator averages depends on the channel capacity of the
system.62 Channels that the cable operator is mandated to carry (as for must-carry and Public,
Educational, and Government channels) were excluded from the calculation.
Cable operators immediately challenged the new rules, arguing that they would face irreparable
harm if the rules were implemented. Their core argument was that for some (many) systems and
tiers, the maximum leased access rate would be zero.63 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit stayed the order in May, 2008.64 Whether leased access rates can be revised while retaining
their character as marginal opportunity costs remains to be seen.
section, we focus on the rates charged for networks carried on programming tiers.
59FCC (2006a, Par. 9) reported that the average cable system carried 0.7 leased access channels.
60This is a non-trivial calculation, even for cable systems. The challenge arises from the fact that revenues from
networks that are offered in tiers are not disaggregated by network (even if costs are). The Order solved this problem
by calculating an average mark-up for each tier that is subject to the leased access provision as the total revenue of
that tier less the operator’s total costs from that tier. It then applies that markup to the per-subscriber affiliate fee
associated with each network offered in the tier. Appendix D in the Order provides a simple motivating example.
61An overall cap was important as the new structure might create incentives for cable operators to game the
system with tier design, particularly for tiers with many mandated-carriage channels and few non-mandated-carriage
channels.
62The leased access set-aside depends on the channel capacity of the system. See SRO at Pars. 4, 45. For most
systems and tiers, the average would be over the lowest 15% of activated channels.
63See, e.g., Request of National Cable & Television Association for a Stay, March 28, 2008, Exhibit 1 (Declaration
of Melinda Witmer, Executive Vice President, Chief Programming Officer, Time Warner Cable) at Par. 4, “Based
on [a] good-faith determination, it appears the new formula will for the vast majority of TWC systems produce a
rate of zero or near zero.”
64As did the Office of Management and Budget in July 2008. In an unusual event, OMB ruled that the new rule
failed to take into account the additional costs, staffing, and risks to proprietary information of cable system and was
thus inconsistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act.
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6 Conclusion
This paper summarizes four issues of interest for economists at the Federal Communications Com-
mission during 2007-2008. While this is only a small portion of the economic analysis conducted
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